Initiating a Nuclear Strike Isn’t a Simple Push of a Button — Legal Experts Weigh In on Whether U.S. Generals Can Disobey Trump’s Orders
The process of launching a nuclear weapon is far more intricate than pressing a button — and recent legal commentary provides insight into what might unfold if a U.S. president, such as Donald Trump, were to issue such an order.
Amid rising geopolitical friction — notably between the U.S., Israel, Iran, and their influential partners — anxiety over potential nuclear conflict is reemerging. In this tense atmosphere, legal experts are reexamining an important issue: Can military leaders lawfully refuse a nuclear launch directive from the president?
Firing a Nuclear Weapon Is Not as Simple as It Sounds: Legal Authority and the Power to Refuse
A legal authority has clarified the boundaries of presidential power when it comes to initiating a nuclear attack — especially given concerns that Donald Trump might give such a command during heightened international tensions.
As conflict grows more volatile between nations like the U.S., Israel, and Iran — and with nuclear-equipped states like Russia and China involved — fears over a broader war or even a nuclear confrontation are intensifying.
Worries about a president’s unchecked control over nuclear arms are not new. Back in 2017, during a standoff with North Korea, Professor Anthony Colangelo from Southern Methodist University in Dallas tackled this subject directly. He outlined the legal grounds under which military personnel could reject a president’s nuclear launch order.
Under U.S. law, the president — as commander-in-chief — holds exclusive authority to authorize a nuclear strike. Yet, Colangelo pointed out that military members are not required to follow commands that violate the law — and may actually face legal consequences if they comply with such orders.
In an interview with the BBC, Colangelo highlighted how a nuclear launch could breach international laws governing warfare — particularly if the nuclear response is disproportionate or results in heavy civilian deaths when other military options are available. The United States is party to international agreements like the Geneva Conventions, which set lawful boundaries in armed conflict.
Should a nuclear attack be considered illegal, those who follow through with it could face prosecution for war crimes. In that scenario, military officers would have a legal — and ethical — obligation to disobey the order.
Still, Colangelo stressed that making these decisions in real-time is extremely difficult. Personnel aboard submarines, for example, may not have access to the full context required to judge whether the command is legitimate. Delaying or questioning the order could also escalate a rapidly deteriorating situation.
Though a general could theoretically be relieved of duty for refusing to carry out a nuclear strike, any replacement would still have a legal duty to refuse if the directive remained unlawful.
Colangelo concluded by warning of the fragile dynamic in play: “If commanders begin second-guessing every order, the entire chain of command could break down.”
Conclusion:
Even though the U.S. president holds the final say in ordering a nuclear strike, the military operates under both legal and ethical frameworks that serve as internal safeguards. As Professor Colangelo makes clear, unlawful orders are not to be obeyed — and compliance could lead to prosecution.
Yet, in the fast-moving and high-pressure world of military operations, recognizing and rejecting such an order is a deeply complex task.
A general might be removed for saying no, but any successor would still be bound by law to do the same if the order is illegal. In the end, while the military system is designed to respect the law, its functionality under intense stress remains uncertain.